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Abstract: In contemporary philosophy of collective intentionality, emotions, 
feelings, moods, and sentiments do not figure prominently in debates on the 
explanation and justification of joint action. Received philosophical theories 
analyze joint action in terms of common knowledge of cognitively complex, 
interconnected structures of intentions and action plans of the participants. 
These theories admit that collective emotions sometimes give rise to joint action 
or more typically, unplanned and uncoordinated collective behavior that falls 
short of full-fledged jointly intentional action. In contrast, minimalist theorists 
pay some attention to affective elements in joint action without much concern 
about their collective intentionality. They refer to an association between low-
level synchrony in perceptual, motor, and behavioral processes, and increased 
interpersonal liking, feelings of solidarity, and cooperativeness. In this paper, we 
outline an account of collective emotions that can bridge this theoretical divide, 
linking the intentional structure of joint actions and the underlying cognitive 
and affective mechanisms. Collective emotions can function as both motivating 
and justifying reasons for jointly intentional actions, in some cases even without 
prior joint intentions of the participants. Moreover, they facilitate coordination 
in joint action.
Keywords: Collective emotions; Joint action; Received theories; Minimalist 
 theories; Motivating reasons; Justifying reasons.
*Corresponding author: Mikko Salmela, Academy of Finland Centre of Excellence in the Phi-
losophy of Social Sciences (TINT), Department of Political and Economic Studies, University of 
Helsinki, Finland, e-mail: mikko.salmela@helsinki.fi
Michiru Nagatsu: Academy of Finland Centre of Excellence in the Philosophy of Social Sciences 
(TINT), Department of Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland
 ©2016, Mikko Salmela and Michiru Nagatsu, published by De Gruyter.  
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.
Brought to you by | Kansalliskirjasto
Authenticated
Download Date | 2/23/18 1:23 PM
34      Mikko Salmela and Michiru Nagatsu
1  Introduction and Overview
In contemporary philosophy of collective intentionality, affective states such as 
emotions, feelings, moods, and sentiments, do not figure prominently in debates 
on the explanation and justification of joint action. Received philosophical theo-
ries analyze joint action in terms of common knowledge of cognitively complex, 
interconnected structures of intentions and action plans of the participants (e.g. 
Gilbert 1989, 1996, 2003, 2014b; Searle 1990, 1995, 2010; Bratman 1992, 1999, 
2009, 2014; Tuomela 1995, 2002, 2007, 2013). These theories admit that collective 
emotions sometimes give rise to joint action or more typically, collective behavior 
that falls short of full-fledged joint intentional action. Such cases may involve the 
joy of football players who celebrate the goal scored by one of the team members, 
or the rage of protesters who destroy public property in their fury. On the one 
hand, insofar as emotionally motivated actions proceed without mediating joint 
intentions, they do not raise the interest of received philosophical theories that 
require higher-order intentional states for joint action. On the other hand, if col-
lective emotions give rise to joint intentions that proximately give rise to joint 
action, then the analysis of the latter seems to suffice. In sum, the received theo-
rists seem to bracket individuals’ mental states that precede the formation of their 
joint intentions as irrelevant for the necessary and sufficient conditions of joint 
intentions.
Yet even they seem to be aware of the affective dimension of typical joint 
actions. Thus Michael Bratman lists friendship, love, and “the joys of conversa-
tion”, along with singing and dancing together, as basic forms of sociality that 
he intends to study in his new book Shared Agency (2014). Although the affec-
tive phenomenology of these activities is familiar to anyone who has engaged in 
them, Bratman’s and the other received theorists’ sophisticated frameworks have 
meager resources for capturing the constitutive affective dimension of friendship 
and love, or the joys of conversation for that matter.
In contrast, the so-called minimalist theorists of joint action have paid some 
attention to the affective elements of joint action. They seeks to articulate a 
minimal architecture of representations and processes that is capable of accom-
modating joint action in its various forms, of which cognitively complex adult 
human cooperation is a special case (e.g. Sebanz and Knoblich 2009; Vesper et al. 
2010; Knoblich et al. 2011). Several authors refer to empirical evidence on an asso-
ciation between lower-level synchrony and alignment in perceptual, motor, and 
behavioral processes in joint action on the one hand, and increased interpersonal 
liking, feelings of solidarity, and cooperativeness on the other hand (e.g. Tollefsen 
and Dale 2012; Pacherie 2014). Michael (2011) has notably distinguished several 
ways in which shared emotions contribute to coordination between participants 
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in joint action. These include the functions of emotion detection, emotion/mood 
contagion, empathy, and rapport.1 His notion of shared emotion however cannot 
fully address the roles of emotions in joint action. In contrast, our account of 
shared emotions shows how these emotions function not only as coordination 
smoothers but as motivating and justifying reasons for joint actions. Moreover, our 
account enables us to see that collective emotions, by virtue of their intentional-
ity and embodiment, range across the divide between higher and lower levels 
of representations and processes whose opposition has dominated the debate 
between received and minimalist theories of joint action.
In what follows, we discuss collective emotions in joint action in two con-
texts. We lay ground for the discussion by outlining a philosophical account of 
collective emotions (Section 2). Then we move on to joint actions, beginning from 
the role of collective emotions in their explanation and justification (Section 3). 
We argue that collective emotions can function as both motivating and justify-
ing reasons for jointly intentional actions, in some cases even without prior joint 
intentions of the participants, as well as give rise to intentions-in-action envisaged 
by received theories. Second, we address the coordinating functions of collec-
tive emotions in joint action, supplementing minimalist theorists’ remarks – in 
particular Michael’s (2011) – on the basis of our more elaborate account of collec-
tive emotions (Section 4). In the concluding Section 5, we offer some suggestions 
on how existing philosophical accounts of joint action, both cognitively complex 
and minimalistic, should be recast in light of our account.
2  What are Collective Emotions?
The notion of “shared emotion” is ambiguous. On the one hand, sharing of 
emotion refers to a phenomenon in which one person’s expressed emotion is per-
ceived by another person. This is the sense that Michael (2011) and some theorists 
of empathy (e.g. Rimé 2007) have in mind when they discuss shared emotions. 
Thus, Michael gives two necessary conditions for sharing an emotion between 
two persons, x and y:
(a) x expresses his affective state (verbally or otherwise);
(b) y perceives this expression.
1 In a recent paper, Michael and Pacherie (2014) analyze the role of moral emotions such as 
shame and guilt in reinforcing commitment to joint action. Important as they are, these emotions 
are social rather than collective.
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2 Phenomenologically, the evaluative content and affective experience of an emotion are 
 typically intertwined and intentionally directed at the particular object of emotion. Still, while 
the evaluative content of an emotion is necessarily intentional, the affective experience is only 
contingently so. For elaboration, see below.
3 There are other philosophical theories of collective emotions, most notably those of Gilbert 
(2002), Schmid (2009), and Huebner (2011). For a discussion and critique of the former two, see 
Salmela (2012).
4 The collectivity of emotions must also be distinguished from sociality even if most collective 
emotions occur in social contexts, because social emotions such as anger, envy, and guilt are 
collective only if they are shared with others.
On the other hand, the notion of sharing refers to several individuals experienc-
ing an emotion of the same type and content, such as celebrating the success 
of their favorite team with other fans, with mutual awareness of their respective 
emotional state (joy). Most philosophical and empirical accounts of shared and 
collective emotions have been interested in the latter kind of phenomena, invok-
ing the notion of sharing in this sense. Likewise, we suggest the following for-
mulation: x and y share an emotion, or equivalently have a collective emotion if,
(c) x and y experience an emotion of the same type with similar (1) evaluative 
content and (2) affective experience.2
(d) x and y are mutually aware that (c).
Our main contribution in this paper is an elaboration of these necessary yet not 
sufficient conditions in terms of the degree of collectivity.
We first suggest that the collectivity of emotions should be understood as a 
continuum rather than as an on/off question.3,4 This is because two main dimen-
sions of emotions, evaluative content and affective experience, allow for a contin-
uum in terms of their sharedness. Moreover, emotions involve action tendencies 
such as attack in anger and apologizing in guilt, as several emotion theorists have 
emphasized (Frijda 1986, 2002; Griffiths 2004; Scarantino 2010). In the collec-
tive context, these action tendencies come with more or less preparedness for 
joint action, and we suggest that this preparedness connects with the collectivity 
of the other dimensions of emotion (see Section 4 for discussion). Here we first 
highlight different ways in which individuals can share the evaluative content of 
emotion, and then discuss the sharing of affective experiences (see Salmela 2012, 
2013 for more detailed accounts).
There is a wide interdisciplinary agreement among emotion researchers that 
emotions could not exist without underlying concerns (e.g. Frijda 1986; Ortony 
et al. 1988; Goldie 2000; Scherer 2001; Roberts 2003; Helm 2008; Schmid 2009). A 
concern in this context is a technical term which refers to a desire, goal, norm, or 
value – a representation with the world-to-mind direction of fit (see Roberts 2003 
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for a representative account) – which however need not have the form of a propo-
sitional attitude. For example, when Alex feels afraid while climbing a 30 meter 
wall, there is an underlying concern, which is his safety; when he feels a joy at 
seeing his children eating a wholesome meal, his underlying concern is their 
healthy growth. By the same token, when a group of people experience a collec-
tive emotion, they have some shared concern. Sharing the evaluative content of 
an emotion is thus a matter of appraising the particular object of emotion simi-
larly with others on the basis of shared concerns, where the degree of sharedness 
can vary (see below). The appraisal process need not be collective though it can 
in some cases be, such as when an emotional appraisal is formed as a result of 
public discussion (see Halperin 2014). However, emotional appraisals are often 
so fast that it is impossible to make, let alone commit oneself to, them collectively. 
Although Gilbert (2002, 2014a) has defended a position of this kind, it is more rea-
sonable to think that we can come to share the underlying concerns of collective 
emotions in importantly dissimilar ways, some of which involve commitment.5
In the weakest form of collectivity, people share a concern if they have overlap-
ping private concerns. Insofar as people pursue their own survival, security, attach-
ment, health, happiness, and attachment, these are private concerns. Tuomela 
(2007) calls concerns of this kind plain I-mode concerns. Individuals can establish 
groups whose members cooperate in promoting their convergent private concerns. 
Groups of this kind may include economic sharing groups and self-help groups, 
such as dieting groups, alcoholics anonymous, and so on. The fact that private con-
cerns or goals are general or even universal among all humans does not amount to 
their collectivity but merely to their commonality, which is a different thing.
Concerns can be shared in a somewhat stronger sense when individuals are 
privately committed to some concern [in part because of] believing that the others 
in the group have the same concern, and also believing that this is mutually 
believed in the group. Thus, for instance, if John as a Liverpool fan is concerned 
5 While shared concerns are the most important background condition for the elicitation of shared 
emotional appraisals, they are embedded within a more comprehensive set of attitudes that sub-
jects of these emotions share. People who share emotions often have a history of common experi-
ences in the context of shared social practices as well as representations thereof, as  Parkinson 
et al. (2005), Schmid (2009), Konzelmann Ziv (2009), and – most comprehensively – von Scheve 
and Ismer (2013) point out. Therefore, in addition to concerns, group members typically also share 
other cognitive, conative, and evaluative attitudes in a more or less collective sense, analogously to 
sharing concerns. Together such shared attitudes constitute the intentional background from which 
collective emotions can emerge in situations that impinge on some shared concern or concerns of 
individuals. Convergent emotional appraisals depend then on sharing at least some other attitudes 
besides concerns, of which the latter are still the most important because without them, collective 
emotions would not emerge in the first place.
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about the future of this prestigious football club, not only does he believe that the 
other Liverpool fans have the same concern, but also that the other fans believe 
the same about his and other fans’ having the concern in question. The brack-
eted clause refers to the fact that many of our shared concerns (as well as beliefs) 
are socially grounded. That is, we come to have concerns because we believe that 
other members of our group have them, where this belief is either a reason or a 
cause or both for my adopting the same concern. The commitment is still private, 
but the concern is shared with others, unlike in the first case where these too are 
private. Tuomela has characterized this type of collectivity as pro-group I-mode 
or, more recently (Tuomela 2013), weak we-mode collectivity. In our terminology, 
concerns of this kind are moderately collective. The main point is that the commit-
ment is still up to the individual to revise and renounce for private reasons alone. 
Groups based on concerns of this kind may include loose associations, such as 
unorganized fan groups or social and religious movements.
The strongest mode of collectivity in sharing concerns is founded on the 
group members’ collective commitment, either explicit or implicit. In addition, 
there is a mutual belief among the group members that they share the concern 
to which they have collectively committed themselves. Through their collec-
tive commitment, the group members adopt the concern as theirs in a strong 
we-mode sense. Collective commitment provides the group members group 
reasons to think, want, feel, and act in ways that are in accordance with their 
shared concern. Moreover, the group members are allowed to revise their commit-
ment to the shared concern only by reasons that are acceptable from the group’s 
point of view. Collective commitment implies a Collectivity Condition according 
to which the group members necessarily “stand or fall together” when acting as 
group members. For instance, individual players of a team win a match if and 
only if their team wins the match. No group is by definition an example of a 
strong we-mode group because that depends on its meeting the criteria of col-
lective commitment, groups reasons, and Collectivity Condition. Candidates of 
such groups include organized fan groups, religious groups, workgroups, theater 
ensembles, bands, orchestras, and families.
The idea of emotions having reasons may strike one as strange. However, a 
closer look reveals that emotions have both justifying and motivating reasons; 
indeed this idea is accepted in contemporary philosophy of emotions and meta-
ethics (e.g. Greenspan 1988; D’Arms and Jacobson 2000; Helm 2008; Brady 2011). 
Emotions have justifying reasons as they are liable to evaluation in terms of their 
appropriateness like other intentional attitudes. In general, an emotion is justi-
fied if its particular object has properties that render it fitting for an emotional 
response of a certain kind. For instance, my fear is appropriate if the object of 
my fear has properties that render it capable of inflicting significant harm on me 
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(or some others I care about). Justifying reasons of collective emotions may refer 
to collectively accepted shared attitudes of a group, such as its values, goals, or 
intentions that were at stake in the emotion-eliciting situation. The same group 
attitudes may also serve as motivating reasons of collective emotions as group 
members evaluate situations in terms of their significance to the group’s values, 
goals, or intentions. Since emotions are not under voluntary control, there is 
no deliberation on reasons to feel in the same way as there is deliberation on 
reasons to act. We can nevertheless talk about reasons (rather than mere causes) 
of emotion because human emotions are not reflexes or fixed action patterns but 
flexible responses to cognitively processed situational meaning.
The typology of shared concerns explains how the the evaluative content 
of an emotion comes to be shared, but how is an affective experience shared? 
Ritual theories of collective emotions (Durkheim 2001; Collins 2004) high-
light the alignment of bodily and behavioral aspects of individual emotional 
responses – physiological changes, facial expressions, action tendencies, and 
subjective feelings – as the central features of collective emotions. Causal pro-
cesses that contribute to the synchronization of emotional responses and expe-
riences between interacting subjects include attentional deployment (Collins 
2004; Brosch 2014), emotional contagion (Hatfield et al. 1994), facial mimicry 
(Bourgois and Hess 2008), motor mimicry and imitation (Chartrand and Bargh 
1999), and neural mirroring (Decety and Meyer 2008). Although these are all 
relevant mechanisms through which emotions come to be shared, as some min-
imalist theorists of joint action have recently observed, we argue that shared 
concerns provide a rational impetus to the causal processes of affective syn-
chronization. A non-reflective absorption in shared affective experience may 
sometimes take the form of a phenomenological fusion of feelings into our 
feeling that Schmid (2009) highlights as the core of collective emotions. We do 
not believe though that a phenomenological fusion of feelings alone indicates 
strong collectivity because it seems possible to experience such a fusion with 
importantly dissimilar shared concerns, which makes it insufficient in distin-
guishing between collective emotions of different kinds.
Feelings of emotion face both inwards and outwards: they are felt as bodily 
sensations that emerge from the various organismic and behavioral changes that 
partially constitute emotion, but they also infuse our intentional representations 
of particular objects in the world in typical emotional experiences where the 
intentional object of emotion is also the object of attention (see Salmela 2005; 
Lambie and Marcel 2002). In these cases, the shared affective experience can be 
phenomenologically described as “feeling together that the object or occurrence 
in question matters” to the involved individuals, as Sánchez Guerrero (2013, p. 
180) suggests. Phenomenologically, interpersonal affective synchrony gives rise 
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to mutual feelings of togetherness and rapport (e.g. Hove & Risen 2009; van 
Baaren et al. 2009; Kirschner & Tomasello 2010; Reddish et al. 2013). We believe 
that mechanisms of affective synchronization provide an important enabling 
condition for the togetherness-aspect of shared intentional feelings as well.
Finally, beginning from the weakest type of collective emotion, we suggest 
that these emotions emerge when a group of individuals appraise the emotion-
eliciting event convergently in relation to their overlapping private concerns, and 
such mechanisms as attentional deployment, emotional contagion, facial and 
motor mimicry, and behavioral entrainment synchronize the individuals’ emo-
tional responses, producing a shared affective experience among individuals 
who are mutually aware that others are feeling the same.6 Moderately collective 
emotions have moderately shared concerns as the underlying ground of emo-
tional appraisals. These concerns are constitutive of a social identity or a group in 
terms of which the individuals identify themselves. A shared affective experience 
emerges through similar mechanisms. Shared group membership reinforces the 
synchronization process, adding to the intensity of the shared affective experi-
ence. Moderately collective emotions are functionally and phenomenologically 
experienced in the role of a group member, but the group membership is nor-
matively weak because it is self-appointed and maintained through a private 
identification or commitment. Finally, strongly collective emotions emerge when 
members of the group appraise the emotion-eliciting event convergently in rela-
tion to their strongly shared concern. The strong collectivity of an emotion is 
reflected both in the degree of synchronization of individual emotional responses 
into a shared affective experience and in the evaluative content of the group 
members’ emotions. The members of a winning team do not rejoice merely in 
winning the championship but instead in “our winning the championship” or 
in “our accomplishment” where the group membership is normative in a strong 
sense. In this way, collective content in the sense of indexicality and mode are 
built into collective emotions of the strongest kind.
Together, shared evaluative content and shared affective experience consti-
tute the two dimensions of collective emotions. By virtue of these two dimensions, 
collective emotions are capable of (1) providing both motivating and justifying 
reasons for joint action and (2) functioning as coordinating smoothers in joint 
action. In the next two sections, we show how our account of collective emotions 
6 Collective emotions of this kind may not be collectively intentional as they lack a shared inten-
tional object and an underlying robustly shared concern. However, we would not go so far as to 
deny that these emotions are collective in any sense as one reviewer of this paper suggested. For 
the participants still have emotions of the same type with a similar (if not the same) evaluative 
content which, together with mutual awareness, meet our conditions (c) and (d) above.
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improves on existing accounts of joint action in both respects, thereby bridging 
the gap between the received and minimalist views.
3   Collective Emotions as Motivating and 
 Justifying Reasons of Joint Action
Our discussion in this section focuses on two issues: (1) collective emotions as 
motivating reasons of joint action with collectively intentional structure, and 
(2)  collective emotions as justifying reasons of joint action. Regarding the first 
issue, our goal is to demonstrate that our account of collective emotions satisfies 
all the desiderata for collective intentionality specified by the received philosophi-
cal theories of joint action. Regarding the second, our goal is to show that collec-
tive emotions can provide justifying reasons for joint action that emerges from 
those emotions. This question has not been discussed in the received theories.
3.1   Collective Emotions as Motivating Reasons of Collectively 
Intentional Joint Action
Philosophical theories of joint action maintain that joint actions are more than 
aggregates of individual actions and therefore their intentionality is irreducible 
to that of individual actions. Moreover, these theories assume that the  collectively 
intentional structure of joint actions can be explicated by defining the shared or 
joint intentions that both psychologically motivate and rationally justify instances 
of joint action.7 Thus an instance of collective behavior qualifies as joint inten-
tional action if and only if it is founded on a shared intention of the participants. 
In spite of their differences, these theories have some common requirements for 
the intentional structure of joint action.8 Pacherie (2013) names these as (1) the 
7 Different authors use different concepts, speaking of shared intentions, joint intentions, or col-
lective intentions. We use these terms interchangeably unless otherwise stated.
8 One main disagreement between the received theories concerns the “collectivity” of inten-
tions. Bratman (1999, 2014) defends an individualist view according to which shared intentions 
are interrelated individual intentions with a collective content (“that we J”) together with other 
conditions such as meshing individual subplans, disposition to help others to fill their roles 
in the relevant joint action if needed, interdependence in the persistence of each participant’s 
relevant intention, common knowledge of the previous conditions, and mutual responsiveness 
to the other’s intentions and actions. In contrast, Searle (1990, 1995, 2010), Gilbert (1989, 1996, 
2003, 2014b), and Tuomela (2002, 2005, 2007, 2013) are collectivists in the sense that they require 
irreducibly collective we-intentions for joint intentional action.
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common outcome requirement; (2) the individual intentional action requirement; 
(3) the common goal requirement; (4) the action  coordination requirement; (5) 
the intentional action coordination requirement; and (6) the joint goal require-
ment. We call the theories with these characteristics as the received view of joint 
action.
The common goal requirement imposes that the common outcome require-
ment and the individual intentional action requirement are related in a particular 
way, namely that there is a certain outcome O to which several agents contribute 
and that the actions of each agent involved are intentional under the descrip-
tion of bringing about the outcome O. Yet actions that satisfy these three require-
ments are not joint as they allow actions in which the agents contribute to the 
same goal which they have in common only in a distributive sense, unbeknownst 
to each other and without coordination. Accordingly, the action coordination 
requirement and its modified form of intentional action coordination require-
ment demand coordination among the agents’ actions, which can be emergent 
and involuntary in the former case but must be voluntary and directed towards 
the agents’ shared goal in the latter case. Pacherie states that actions that meet 
the requirements (1–5) are jointly intentional in a weak sense in which agents 
intentionally coordinate the means they use to achieve a common goal. However, 
philosophical theories of joint action typically require that the goal of a joint 
action is collective in a stronger sense. The joint goal is achieved together or, as in 
some theories, there is also a collective commitment to the goal as our goal.9 Here 
the jointness of actions is not just a means to a goal but a part of the goal itself.
The received theories admit that individuals may have diverse motivations 
to participate in joint intentions and joint actions, some of which can be emo-
tional. However, these theories pay no attention to emotions, either individual 
or collective, among the myriad of possible motivations of joint action. The idea 
seems to be that whatever other mental states agents have, joint intentions are 
the primary and sufficient motivating reasons for joint action. On this view, col-
lective emotions can give rise to joint action by giving rise to joint intentions that 
mediate between collective emotions and joint action. Indeed, (Gilbert 2002, 
2014a), whose theory of collective intentionality requires joint commitment as one 
of the central conditions for joint action, suggests that collective emotions involve 
a joint commitment to the emotion itself as well as to acting in accordance with 
the emotion. This means for example that when individuals are jointly committed 
to grieving as a body, they are committed to maintaining a somber outlook and to 
9 Pacherie does not mention the latter, normative account of the jointness of a joint goal which 
is central in Gilbert’s and Tuomela’s theories in her description of the joint goal requirement.
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speaking in a silent voice. While Gilbert is right in allowing collective emotions 
to motivate and rationalize joint intentional action, this modeling of collective 
emotions on joint intention, or bracketing the former more generally, fails to do 
justice to the important motivating and justifying roles of collective emotions in 
joint action.
To make our case, we draw on Pacherie’s (2002) analysis of individual emo-
tional action, and extend it to cases of joint emotional action. Pacherie’s typology 
of emotional actions is particularly useful in distinguishing between importantly 
dissimilar actions, some of which have an intentional structure even if they are 
motivated by emotions.
The category that best fits the accounts of received joint action theorists is 
what Pacherie calls semi-deliberate emotional actions. An emotional action of 
this kind emerges for example if a person gets angry at his or her oppressive treat-
ment but there is none to punish directly to get the situation right, which leads 
the person to form a conscious intention to join an NGO that fights against the 
particular kind of oppression. Here the situation in which the emotion emerges 
and the situation in which the action tendency that emerges from the emotion 
finds its realization are different, or at least there is some means-end reasoning 
leading from the initial situation to its subsequent phase. Still, it is the emotional 
evaluation of the situation and the adjacent action tendency that provide the 
motivating reason for action.
It is easy to see why Pacherie’s semi-deliberate emotional actions fit nicely 
with received philosophical theories of joint action. There are mediating joint 
intentions between the collective emotions of individuals and their joint action. 
Collective emotion motivates individuals to join their forces in planning their 
joint action; joint intentions with meshing individual subplans are formed in this 
process; and those plans are executed with motivation that derives at least in 
part from the underlying collective emotion. As in the individual case, collective 
emotions provide motivating reasons for these jointly intentional actions. Even 
if joint intention and/or the participatory individual intentions of the agents are 
proximate reasons for joint action, the chain of reasons goes back to the collec-
tive emotion and – ultimately – to the shared concern of the group members. 
Moreover, even if the same joint action can in some cases be produced by joint 
intentions that are not based on a collective emotion, emotions may be necessary 
as motivating reasons in other cases.
One of these cases is collective guilt, perhaps the most studied kind of collec-
tive emotion so far (see e.g. Gilbert 2002; Branscombe and Doosje 2004; Tollefsen 
2006; Konzelmann Ziv 2007; Ferguson and Branscombe 2014). This is an emotion 
that individuals feel upon some perceived wrong that the subjects themselves or 
members of their in-group have committed, typically, to an outgroup. Collective 
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guilt motivates apologetic and restorative joint actions towards the wronged out-
group. Even if the same actions could be motivated by joint intentions formed 
without collective guilt, we would doubt the sincerity of those actions because 
the underlying emotion indicates that the actions spring from the ethically correct 
motives of remorse and regret. Stocker (1976) pointed out in a now classic essay in 
moral psychology that emotions are sometimes necessary as motives of morally 
virtuous action even if the same action such as visiting a friend in hospital could 
be performed from other motives. The example of collective guilt suggests the 
same: collective emotions are sometimes necessary as the right kind of motivat-
ing reasons of joint action.
More problematic cases are impulsive emotional actions, such as punching 
someone in a bar brawl, running away in fright, and hugging one’s fellow sup-
porters in joy at the victory of one’s favorite football team (all Pacherie’s exam-
ples), that people often think of as paradigmatic examples of emotional actions. 
Instead of involving separate representations of goals and means, there is a col-
lapse of evaluative and executive representations so that objects of emotions are 
represented in terms of properties such as horribleness, danger, oppressiveness, 
etc. that are also injunctions to act in accordance with the appraisal (see also Grif-
fiths 2004; Scarantino 2010). To quote Pacherie (2002, p. 77), “there is no need for 
intermediate reflexive states, no need for the agent to first become consciously 
aware of his emotional state and to consciously formulate a plan for dealing with 
the situation”. The spontaneity of impulsive emotional actions is reflected also in 
their sense of passivity and experienced lack of voluntariness.10
Collective emotions can provide motivating reasons for impulsive joint 
actions insofar as those actions are done for reasons. One might however ques-
tion the collective intentionality (i.e. the presence of an intentional structure 
specified above) of impulsive emotional actions that are spontaneous and done 
without regard for their consequences beyond the immediate situation. Our 
answer to such a skepticism is that it depends on the degree of collectivity of the 
emotion in question.
In the weakest sense of collectivity, where the underlying shared concerns 
of collective emotions are overlapping private concerns, the ensuing impulsive 
10 Pacherie (2002) distinguishes a third type of emotional action, those of fully deliberate 
 emotional actions. These are actions motivated by an anticipation of an emotion, either posi-
tive or negative, that the agent wants to either experience or avoid, using this anticipation as 
motivation for his or her action. Emotional joint actions of this kind are obviously possible, for 
instance, when a group of people use an anticipation of collective fear to avoid a possible danger 
to the group. However, we do not discuss these cases because they operate similarly through the 
agents’ joint intentions as semi-deliberate emotional joint actions.
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collective behavior does not qualify as jointly intentional action. There is no joint 
or even common goal, nor any coordination between individuals insofar as eve-
ryone seeks to protect his or her interests, as in the case of panicked sharehold-
ers who rush to sell their stocks in the fear of an economic meltdown. As the 
result of the shareholders’ impulsive emotional collective behavior, stock prices 
plummet and everyone loses. Moreover, the actions of individual shareholders 
that contribute to this outcome are not intentional under the description of bring-
ing about that outcome together with other shareholders – quite the contrary: 
individual shareholders intended to save their own skins by selling their stocks. 
The example indicates that impulsive collective behavior motivated by collec-
tive emotions of the weakest type is not jointly intentional as it has no joint or 
common goal, nor coordination between the agents.11
Strongly collective emotions in contrast can motivate jointly intentional 
action. These emotions are founded on strongly shared concerns to which indi-
viduals have committed themselves collectively as group members. Strongly 
shared concerns provide the group members group reasons to feel emotions in 
situations where the members believe or perceive that their shared concern is 
affected favorably or adversely. Those collective emotions also provide motivating 
reasons for the group members to act in accordance with the action tendency of 
their collective emotion. Most importantly, it seems that emotions of this kind are 
capable of initiating collectively intentional joint action spontaneously, without 
prior deliberation on goals and means, and the group-level joint intentions and 
participatory intentions of individual group members to do their parts of the joint 
action are formed implicitly during rather than prior to acting together.
Received theorists have made room for this possibility of joint intentions 
emerging in action rather than prior to it. Searle (1983) introduced the distinction 
between a prior intention and an intention-in-action to accommodate the execu-
tion of prior intentions as well as the intentionality of spontaneous individual 
actions, and the same distinction can be applied to joint intentional actions 
(Searle 2010). Thus there are prior we-intentions to act, and we-intentions-in-action 
during the performance of a joint action. In a like manner, Tuomela (2007, p. 109) 
states that a joint intention to perform X jointly “can be understood liberally so as 
to allow that the participants need only have an intention-in-action to participate 
in the collective performance of X”. However, the notion of an intention-in-action 
merely accommodates such a possibility within the theoretical framework of the 
11 Interestingly, for instance, a herd of impalas’ fleeing caused by a similar emotional contagion 
of one impala’s fear of a lion does not create a comparable collective action problem. For this 
reason it may be described as serving the goal of the herd, although the action is not collectively 
intentional in the received theorists’ sense.
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received view, telling us little about how we-intentions-in-action can actually 
arise.12 We claim that strongly collective emotions provide one such mechanism 
underlying spontaneous joint actions.
More specifically, we suggest that the action tendencies of strongly collec-
tive emotions provide a plausible mechanism to initiate and maintain joint inten-
tions. The intentional object of emotion provides the target of an action and the 
emotion type specifies the action type – escape or avoidance of danger in fear; 
retaliating or punishing an offender in anger; apologizing and/or compensating 
to a victim in guilt, and so on. Strongly collective emotions give rise to impulsive 
yet collectively intentional action especially in situations that afford ways of sat-
isfying the action tendency of the emotion on the spot. Through their intentional 
structure, these emotions also specify the group members an outcome to which 
the members contribute under the description of bringing about that outcome in 
emergent and/or voluntary coordination with each other. Moreover, a strongly 
collective emotion gives rise to a joint intention without an additional collective 
commitment to it. Instead, the collective commitment to the underlying shared 
concern of the emotion carries over to the relevant joint intention. One of Pach-
erie’s examples of impulsive emotional action, joyful celebration of the victory 
of one’s favorite team together with other fans of the team, may qualify as an 
example. The fans need not form a prior joint intention to celebrate the team’s 
victory even if they may anticipate it toward the end of the game if their favorite 
team is leading. Instead, celebration with songs, chants, and cheers breaks 
immediately after the game has ended in the team’s victory. Here we have a case 
of collectively intentional joint intention formed while acting on a strongly (or 
even moderately) collective emotion of the individuals. We discuss how our pro-
posal relates to that of minimalist theorists in Section 4.
3.2  Collective Emotions as Justifying Reasons of Joint Action
The evaluative-cum-motivational structure of emotions allows them to provide 
reasons for action even if the agent is not aware of emotion as his or her reason at 
the time of acting. This lack of transparency undermines the status of emotions 
as reasons for action according to internalist theories of justification as Pacherie 
(2002) points out. However, she highlights adaptiveness as another independent 
and perhaps more important requirement for justification. “For an emotion not 
just to causally explain an action but also to rationalize it, it must be the case 
12 This is not a criticism of the received theory. In fact a good scientific theory anticipates certain 
phenomena whose workings will be filled out by researchers later.
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that: (1) the emotion is appropriate, that is, that the emotional assessment of the 
situation is correct, and (2) the action generated by the emotion is indeed adap-
tive, that it helps the end of the agent” (Pacherie 2002, p. 85; see also Greenspan 
1988). The same criteria can be explicated for collective emotions as justifying 
reasons of joint action.
We suggest that a collective emotion justifies a joint action when (1) the 
emotion is appropriate, that is, the emotional assessment of the situation that 
individuals face as a group is correct from the group’s point of view, and (2) the 
emotion generates a joint action that promotes the shared concern of the group 
members. The key task of this proposal is to spell out the appropriateness of col-
lective emotions. One of us (Salmela 2014) has argued that a collective emotion 
is appropriate if it is felt for a group reason that emerges from a set of internally 
coherent constitutive group attitudes whose aspects have not been adopted or 
maintained by ignoring evidence that is available to the group members. Two main 
aspects of this proposal are group reasons and the internal coherence of constitu-
tive group attitudes.
Shared concerns provide justifying group reasons for collective emotions in 
situations in which the group members’ shared concerns are affected favorably 
or adversely. For instance, when a shared goal is in danger, the group members 
have group reasons to fear, or when the group members have reached their goal 
by their own efforts, they have group reasons to feel proud. However, the appro-
priateness of an emotional assessment from the group’s point view requires also 
that the shared concern is coherent with the group’s wider epistemic and norma-
tive perspective. The constitutive group attitudes must be in synchronic and dia-
chronic coherence with each other, and these attitudes cannot be maintained by 
ignoring or neglecting evidence that is available to the group members.13
Criterion (2) requires joint actions generated by collective emotions to promote 
the shared concerns of the group members. Here the typology of collective emo-
tions in terms of their collectivity is again important. In the weakest type of col-
lective emotions, such as in the case of shareholders’ fear of a market meltdown, 
there are no robustly shared concerns but only overlapping private concerns. 
Accordingly, each shareholder is concerned about minimizing his or her losses. 
This concern justifies the shareholders’ action to sell their stocks qua individu-
als, but not qua group members because they all lose as the consequence of their 
aggregate action. Instead of protecting the shareholders from danger, acting on 
their weakly collective fear results in the realization of their fears. This indicates 
that collective behavior motivated by weakly collective emotions often cannot be 
13 For details of this account on the appropriateness of collective emotions, see Salmela 2014.
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justified by those emotions as it tends to harm the overlapping private concerns 
of the involved individuals. Contagious reactions to overlapping private concerns 
probably have evolutionary advantages, as in the case of a herd of impalas fleeing 
from a lion, but the analogous reactions by humans in modern contexts seem 
often harmful, though this ultimately depends on the context.
The situation is different with moderately and especially strongly collec-
tive emotions. Here we have groups with more robustly shared concerns of the 
members. Accordingly, joint actions motivated by collective emotions of these 
kinds promote the group members’ shared concerns by default rather than con-
tingently. Semi-deliberate emotional joint actions may be more reliably adap-
tive than impulsive emotional joint actions from the group’s perspective as the 
former kind of joint actions allow for more planning, division of labor, and vol-
untary coordination in the action. Still, impulsive emotional joint actions can be 
adaptive from the group’s perspective as well. This is the case especially if the 
emotion-eliciting situation calls for immediate joint action. Here the collectively 
intentional structure of those actions – their having a joint outcome to which the 
group members contribute under the description of bringing about that outcome 
in coordination with each other – is central for those joint actions to be beneficial. 
These joint actions also benefit from more extensive interpersonal synchrony in 
comparison to semi-deliberate emotional joint actions. In the next section we 
relate our proposal to the minimalist theories, which highlight the process of this 
synchrony.
4   Collective Emotions as Coordination Smoothers 
in Joint Action
In this section, we focus on the role of collective emotions as coordination devices 
in joint action. Our discussion criticizes and expands the observations of mini-
malist theories of joint action, in particular John Michael’s. We begin with a brief 
general description of the minimalist approach, followed by Michael’s account of 
shared emotions as coordination smoothers in joint action. Our positive contribu-
tion here is founded on the point that the processes of alignment and synchrony 
studied by minimalist theories are constitutive rather than contingent aspects 
of collective emotions. Therefore collective emotions can not only initiate joint 
action “bottom up”, but also orchestrate it “top down”, facilitating coordination.
Minimalist theorists of joint action argue that the focus of received philo-
sophical analyses of joint action “is on the coordination of agents’ intentions 
prior to acting, but they pay little heed to the perceptual, cognitive, and motor 
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mechanisms enabling people to coordinate online” (Pacherie 2014, p. 30; see 
also Tollefsen 2014). Minimalists are eager to accuse philosophers of cooking up 
“heavily mentalistic stews” in their “solitary armchairs” (Sebanz and Knoblich 
2009, p. 365). Criticisms of this kind are partially misdirected, though, since both 
high- and low-level mechanisms of coordination are typically involved in joint 
action, and should be accounted for in comprehensive explanations of joint 
action. Moreover, most mainstream philosophical theorists are aware of the limi-
tations of their analytic method: their silence concerning low-level mechanisms 
of coordination does not reflect a dismissal of the importance of such mecha-
nisms, but rather an acknowledgement that the study of these mechanisms is 
better left to competent empirical researchers. In sum, there is no reason why 
mainstream analytic approaches should not be complemented by empirical as 
well as theoretical research aiming to articulate the minimal architecture of rep-
resentations and processes that is capable of accommodating joint action in its 
various forms, of which cognitively and normatively complex adult human joint 
action is only a special case. Knoblich et al. (2011) for example provide a com-
prehensive review of psychological research on joint action behavioral entrain-
ment, action affordances, perception-action matching, and action simulation 
as sources of emergent coordination, and shared task representations and joint 
perceptions as processes that contribute to planned coordination. Their own pro-
posal (with Cordula Vesper in Vesper et al. 2010) for a minimal architecture of 
joint action highlights, similarly, shared task or goal representations; monitoring 
and prediction processes that operate on these representations; and coordination 
smoothers that reliably simplify coordination. One type of coordination smoother 
is synchronization of movements that makes oneself or the other more predicta-
ble. Behavioral synchrony also constitutes the core of Tollefsen and Dale’s (2012) 
minimalistic account of joint action.
Tollefsen and Dale (2012) point out several problems in mainstream philo-
sophical theories of joint action concerning the execution, implementation and 
multiple initiation of joint action, as well as the overly intellectual quality and 
verifiability of those theories. To address these problems of received theories, the 
authors present what they call the “alignment system”, “a heterogenous mix of 
diverse components entraining two or more people to specific patterns of behav-
ior”. Instead of providing a theoretical account on this system, Tollefsen and Dale 
present bits and pieces of evidence on lower-level processes that contribute to 
behavioral entrainment during interaction. They refer, for example, to studies 
on alignment of body posture during naturalistic conversation (Shockley et al. 
2009); coupling of visual attention during interaction (Richardson et al. 2007); 
the mirror neuron system (Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004); priming theories of 
alignment (Pickering and Garrod 2004); and emergent self-organizing produced 
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through “coordinative structures” of two or more people, as suggested by dynamic 
system theories. Together, Tollefsen and Dale refer to these and other lower-level 
mechanisms of entrainment in joint action as “surface synchrony” that underlies 
and sustains “deep commitments” to higher-order goals and intentions but can 
also “kick-start” joint actions. Tollefsen and Dale mention collective emotions as 
an example of lower-level processes that can initiate joint actions, such as con-
versation. In contrast, our account of collective emotions (presented in Section 2) 
assigns them a non-reductive, functional-theoretical role of producing and 
maintaining wide-ranging synchrony and alignment between individuals. Since 
Michael (2011) is the only minimalist who offers a comparable functional account 
of shared emotions, we discuss first his account and then show ours extends his 
in a crucial way.
Michael discusses behavioral synchrony in shared emotions in the context 
of emotional contagion and rapport.14 Emotional contagion is defined by Hatfield 
et al. 1994, p. 5) as “the tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize facial 
expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements with those of another person, 
and, consequently, to converge emotionally”. Michael notes that contagion con-
tributes to cognitive and bodily alignment, and through its effects on attention 
and memory, renders particular objects and features of the environment more 
salient and some stored information more accessible, thereby facilitating predic-
tion of each other’s behavior. Unconscious behavioral mimicry contributes also to 
rapport, interpersonal liking that emerges from reciprocal expressions of positive 
sentiments of individuals towards each other. Michael argues that rapport facili-
tates coordination of movements in joint action in several ways. It makes predic-
tion of movements similar to one’s own easier and reinforces similarity through 
increased synchronization; contributes to prediction and monitoring by increased 
attention to each other’s movements; fosters a sense of commitment that influ-
ences behavior similarly to explicit commitments; and associates with normative 
pressure to conform to group norms and the tendency to punish dissenters.
Although Michael’s remarks on the emotional underpinnings of behavioral 
alignment and synchrony are more advanced than other minimalists his notion of 
sharing an emotion is rudimentary as it does not even require that the individuals 
have emotions of the same type; merely that I express my affective state (which 
can be an emotion, a feeling, or a mood) and you perceive it, and – possibly but 
not necessarily – vice versa. True enough, in emotional contagion, one person’s 
14 Besides emotional contagion and rapport, Michael discusses the contribution of emotion de-
tection and empathy for coordination in joint action. Here we focus on those forms of shared 
emotions that Michael associates with behavioral synchrony.
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emotional expression causes another to enter into an affective state of the same 
type, such as fear, anger, joy, and so on. Importantly, however, in emotional con-
tagion, the intentional objects of individuals’ affective states, insofar as they have 
any, are different individual tokens of the same type, as is the case with collective 
emotions of the weakest kind, such as shareholders’ fear for their investments. 
Yet without a shared intentional object, the synchronizing and coordinating 
effects of shared emotions remain weaker than when there is one.
To begin with, joint attention to the shared object of emotion is a constitu-
ent rather than a consequence of collective emotion when the individuals are 
co-present in the emotion-eliciting situation (see Collins 2004, 2014). Moreover, 
with moderate and strong forms of shared concerns comes group affiliation that 
influences processes of “surface synchrony”, surveyed by Tollefsen and Dale 
(2012). There is recent evidence that “emotional mimicry is not a ‘blind’ imita-
tion of any given display but rather a social process that depends on the interac-
tional context” (Hess et al. 2014, p. 96). Thus, we mimic facial, vocal, and postural 
expressions of emotion more with those with whom we affiliate by virtue of a 
shared group membership than with out-group members or, even less so, our 
enemies. Just as different aspects of emotional mimicry are connected, the same 
finding applies to behavioral mimicry and synchrony, insofar those behaviors 
are part of emotion such as spontaneous protest against injustice in anger rather 
than contingent behaviors like foot tapping. There is also evidence that the syn-
chronizing effects of collective emotions extend from expressive behavior to cog-
nitive processes. Epistemically, collective emotions lubricate creative processes, 
speeding imagination and recombination of ideas, thus enabling group flow, “a 
state of heightened consciousness, sharpened attention, and total immersion in 
the task at hand”, as Parker and Hackett (2012) point out. Indeed, collective emo-
tions are unique in their capacity to produce and maintain an orchestrated set of 
synchronous processes that together function as coordination smoothers of joint 
action. This explains why collective emotions so often function as bottom-up 
elicitors of joint action.
Interpersonal synchrony seems to be strongest in impulsive emotional joint 
actions motivated by strongly collective emotions, which gives those emotional 
joint actions an advantage over semi-deliberate ones in terms of spontaneous 
coordination. On the other hand, deliberation and planning often compensate for 
the lesser degree of interpersonal synchrony in semi-deliberate emotional joint 
action. Success of joint action is thus facilitated by keeping the collective emotion 
active until the opportunity for a planned joint action in accordance with the 
emotion emerges, or if this is impossible, by reinvigorating the original collective 
emotion by conscious means at the time of acting. Indeed, this is a well-known 
emotion regulation strategy of political activists of all sorts (see e.g. Jasper 2014).
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It is important to realize that strongly shared concerns that underlie strongly 
collective emotions may also contribute to the degree of interpersonal synchrony 
by providing a rational impetus to causal processes of synchronization. In weakly 
collective emotions with underlying private concerns, there is no rational impetus 
to synchronization; only synchrony produced by emotional contagion between 
the co-present individuals that may contingently contribute to an adaptive col-
lective behavior of the individuals. However, a collective emotional response to 
perceiving or knowing that our shared concern is at stake may activate the joint 
action tendencies of the group members rather than the individual action tenden-
cies that belong to emotions with underlying private concerns.15
Though we have emphasized the rational impetus for synchrony above, in 
typical cases of joint action where people are co-present, collective emotions 
proximately function as coordination smoothers by immediately and affectively 
rewarding joint action. Specifically, these rewards arise from sharing emotions 
with others during joint action. Note that this motivational role of shared emotions 
as affective rewards differs from their role as motivating reasons at the intentional 
level of explanation where shared emotions motivate specific joint actions such 
as celebration in joy or apologizing in guilt. Although Michael and other minimal-
ist theorists have paid attention to the affective consequences of behavioral syn-
chrony and alignment, synchrony is only one mechanism that produces affective 
rewards in joint action. With Marion Godman, we (in Godman et al. 2014) argue 
that acting together produces rewards that render all joint actions – not merely 
those  motivated by collective emotions – prima facie intrinsically rewarding and 
thus motivating for the participants.
5   Conclusion: How Collective Emotions 
 Complement Received and Minimalist Theories 
of Joint Action
The debate between received and minimalist theories of joint action is largely one 
between high-level and low-level accounts. Whereas received theories operate 
firmly on the level of complex cognitive, motivational, and normative represen-
tations, minimalist theories invoke low-level representations and processes as 
15 Bacharach (2006) proposes an analogous hypothesis called the interdependence hypothesis 
for team reasoning, which he formulates in game theoretic terms rather than in terms of concerns 
and emotions (see also Pacherie 2011).
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supplementary or, in some cases, alternative to the ones of high-level models. 
Insofar as shared or collective emotions are mentioned in this discussion, they 
are treated as states that belong either to the higher level, as in Gilbert’s theory, 
or to the lower level, as suggested by Tollefsen and Dale. Yet both treatments are 
incomplete insofar as emotions range across the divide between higher and lower 
levels. On the one hand, they associate with the higher level representations 
through their underlying concerns that in a group context involve shared goals, 
values, or norms of the group members. Emotions are also responsive to concep-
tual information and group reasons emerging from the group’s constitutive con-
cerns that Tuomela (2007) calls “a group ethos”. At the same time, emotions are 
also embodied in lower-level states such as distinct neural, physiological, behav-
ioral, and motor changes as well as feelings emerging from these changes.
Collective emotions bridge also another, temporal divide between received 
and minimalist theories. The former offer detailed analyses of the preconditions 
of joint action, whereas the latter focus on mechanisms of coordination during 
joint action. This temporal divide within the research topic has reinforced separa-
tion between the two approaches as a kind of “division of labor”. Yet the perspec-
tive of collective emotions shows the arbitrariness of this division as emotions are 
processes that extend from the preparation of joint action to its execution. Even if 
collective emotions precede joint action only contingently, they non-contingently 
emerge during such action, orchestrating synchronous processes that function 
as coordination smoothers in joint action, and with their rewards, motivating us 
to engage in further instances of joint action. Accordingly, collective emotions 
provide an excellent window to understanding how the planned and emergent 
aspects of coordination come together in joint action.
In this paper we have opened this window by showing how collective emo-
tions can provide both motivating and justifying reasons for joint intentional 
actions, either with mediating prior joint intentions of individuals, or with joint 
intentions-in-action that emerge when the action elicited by collective emotion 
is already underway. Moreover, we have extended and amended Michael’s (2011) 
analysis of the ways in which collective emotions serve as coordination smooth-
ers in joint action. The assimilation of shared intentional objects to collective 
emotions allows us to see how joint attention and joint action tendencies become 
coordinated as intrinsic elements rather than as contingent consequences of col-
lective emotion. Finally, we highlighted the unique capacity of collective emo-
tions to produce and maintain an orchestrated set of synchronous processes that 
together function as coordination smoothers of joint action.
Our results provide a compelling reason for the unification of received and 
minimal approaches to joint action, as they demonstrate that both remain incom-
plete without the other. It is not sufficient to pay lip service to the importance 
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of different approaches while focusing on one’s own research. The received and 
minimalist approaches have to be put together in a complete analysis of joint 
action. Only then can we hope to understand such complex social phenomena as 
friendship and love, singing and dancing together, or the joy of conversation that 
involve coordination at many levels, both mental and bodily.
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